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Abstract 
What are the nails for which public key technologies are supposed to be the hammer?  
This paper examines the kinds of assertions that e-business needs to be authenticated, 
and evaluates conventional and alternative public key infrastructures (PKI) against those 
requirements.  It concludes that the root cause of the limited success enjoyed by public 
key technologies has been inadequate requirements analysis, and proposes how PKI can 
be re-conceived in order to meet the real needs of e-business.. 
1.  Introduction 
Digital signatures and the public key infrastructure (PKI) that supports them were 
portrayed by purveyors of the dot.com myths as the means whereby trust was to be 
achieved in e-commerce and other applications of the Internet.  Yet a web-century has 
passed since the seminal article, and public key cryptography has yet to fulfil its promise.   
This paper argues that the reason is that inadequate care was taken with the definition of 
requirements.  One pervasive myth needs to be debunked at the outset.  The term 
'authentication' does not necessarily have anything to do with identity.  Authentication 
refers to a process whereby a degree of confidence is established in an assertion.  The 
assertion might relate to identity, but in many cases it does not. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to present a taxonomy of assertions whose 
authentication is relevant to e-business.  By eBusiness is meant here the application of 
telecommunications-based tools to the business of people, corporations and government 
agencies.  It encompasses all segments of activity, including B2C, B2B, C2C, e-
government and electronic services delivery. 
The categories of assertion considered in this paper relate to human identities and entities, 
organisational identities and entities, artefact identities and entities, attributes of each of 
them, and value.  The analysis depends on terminology that is variously new and more 
carefully defined than has been the case in the past.  Key terms are shown in bold-face 
type at the point in the text where they are defined. 
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The later sections of the paper consider the extent to which, for all their inadequacies, 
X.509 certificates and the conventional PKI that is associated with them may have 
something to offer.  Alternative certificate-formats and approaches to PKI are identified 
that may address the needs of e-business more effectively.  This paper is a short-form 
presentation of analysis undertaken in two much more detailed papers, Clarke (2001b) 
and Clarke (2001c).  Those two papers provide references to a more substantial 
underlying literature. 
2. Assertions Important to eBusiness 
A fundamental problem with PKI is that most of the research underlying it has been 
applied in orientation rather than instrumentalist research.  That is to say that it has not 
sought to solve a problem, but to find something to do with a tool.  The concept was 
created by Diffie & Helman (1976), as a response to a perceived need, and hence the 
origins were instrumentalist.  Since Diffie & Helman, however, the vast majority of the 
work undertaken has comprised attempts to apply the technology.  Inadequacies in PKI 
arise from a failure to refine the original conception.  These inadequacies can only be 
overcome by articulating the needs of e-business, and then conceiving PKI that will 
address those needs. 
The caption to Steiner's 1993 cartoon, "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog", is 
usually interpreted to mean that a serious problem arises from the lack of identity 
authentication.  There are some circumstances in which this is a problem.  But in most 
circumstances, people can get on with e-business perfectly well, with or without reliable 
knowledge of the other parties' identities by achieving other means for achieving trust 
(Clarke 2000).  This is very fortunate, because as the following sub-section will argue, an 
assertion of human identity is very challenging to authenticate.  
2.1 Assertions About Human Entities and Identities 
The notion of human identity has been inadequately addressed in the literature.  The term 
'human identity' is used in this paper to refer to a particular presentation of a human 
entity.  Individual people perform various social, economic and political functions, in 
roles such as citizen, consumer, sole trader, and member of partnerships and 
unincorporated associations.  A person may present the same persona for every role, or 
different personae for each of them, or a few personae each of which is used in multiple 
contexts.   
It is useful to have a term available that encompasses both identities and the entities that 
underlie them.  In this paper, the term '(id)entity' is used for that purpose. 
Organisations construct models of relevant (id)entities, by capturing data into data 
structures within information systems.  In particular: 
• an (id)entity is represented by data that is stored in a record; 
• an attribute of an (id)entity is represented by a data-item or field within a record;  
and 
• an event involving an (id)entity is represented by a transaction. 
 
Within an organisation's information systems, a real-world (id)entity is operationalised as 
some sub-set of the data that describes it, and that differentiates it from other, similar 
identities.  For example, a car may be differentiated by its accessories, its paint-scheme, a 
particular pattern of dents and scratches, a particular grinding sound when changing 
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gears, and its peculiar cornering characteristics.  More formally, an (id)entifier is one or 
more data-items concerning an (id)entity that are sufficient to distinguish it from other 
instances of its particular class, and that can therefore be used to signify that (id)entity. 
The preceding paragraph defined both an identifier for an identity, and a new term, 
'entifier', which is the signifier for an entity.  The distinction is important:  a name or 
code may be an identifier, but not an entifier.  An entifier for a human being, because it 
must distinguish the physical person from other individuals, is of necessity some form of 
biometric. 
(Id)entification is the process whereby data is associated with a particular (id)entity.  It is 
performed through the acquisition of data that constitutes an (id)entifier for that (id)entity.  
An organisation's purpose in performing an (id)entification process is to establish that an 
(id)entity presenting to it is either: 
• a previously known real-world (id)entity – in which case it will be possible to 
associate the new transaction with an existing record in the relevant information 
system;  or 
• a previously unknown real-world (id)entity – in which case it will be appropriate 
for a new organisational (id)entifier to be established for that party, and a new 
record created in the relevant information system. 
 
The process of (id)entification is a search for the one among many data records that 
corresponds to the presenting (id)entity.  For a comprehensive treatment of human 
identity in information systems, see Clarke (1994). 
One further refinement of existing language is needed, in order to reflect the realities 
confronting e-business.  The relationship between an identity and an underlying entity 
may or may not be known to a record-keeper, and indeed may or may not be knowable.  
The term 'nym' is used here to refer to one or more data-items relating to an identity that 
are sufficient to distinguish it from other instances of its particular class, but without 
enabling association with a specific entity.  That the concept is commonly recognised is 
evidenced by the wide range of synonyms, including also-known-as, aka, alias, avatar, 
handle, nickname, nick, nom de guerre, nom de plume, moniker, persona, personality, 
profile, pseudonym, pseudo-identifier, sobriquet, and stage-name.  The term 'nym' is to be 
preferred, because it is gaining currency, it is derived from a relevant Greek root, and it 
carries little semantic baggage with it. 
A nym enables an individual to act without disclosing which entity they are.  There are 
two important cases.  Anonymity is a characteristic of data, such that it cannot be 
associated with a particular human entity from the data itself, nor by combining it with 
other data.  Pseudonymity is a characteristic of data, such that it cannot, in the normal 
course of events, be associated with a particular human entity.  In most cases, this is 
achieved through the use of some form of pseudo-identifier, with the index that relates the 
identifier to the underlying entity being inaccessible, and effectively protected.  For a 
comprehensive treatment of nymity, see Clarke (1999). 
It is proposed that meaningful discussions about the authentication of human (id)entity 
are not possible unless a model is available of at least the richness depicted in Exhibit 1. 
Some key aspects of this model that differentiate it from the conventional wisdom are 
that: 
• entities underlie identities; 
• the term 'entifier' is necessary, to distinguish a signifier of an entity.  An entity 
may have multiple entifiers, but an entifier relates to precisely one entity; 
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• any entity may have multiple identities; 
• multiple entities might present to other parties using the same identity; 
• an identity may have multiple identifiers; 
• data may not be able to be reliably associated with a particular entity, even 
though it can be related to an identity.  The term 'nym' is useful to signify an 
identifier for such an identity; 
• it may or may not be apparent that what appears to be an identifier may be only a 
nym. 
 
On the basis of this model, it is possible to propose definitions for the first of a series of 
assertion-types relevant to e-business. 
Identity authentication is the process whereby an organisation establishes its degree of 
confidence in an assertion that a party is who they purport to be.  More laboriously, but 
more precisely, it is a process designed to cross-check against additional evidence the 
identity that is asserted or inferred by an identifier acquired during an identification 
process.  An item of evidence is usefully referred to as an 'authenticator' (such as the 
nomination of additional identifier, or demonstrated knowledge), or a 'credential' (such 
as a document purporting to be associated with the person, or a token such as an 'identity 


















Exhibit 1: A Model of Human (Id)entity 
 
The term entity authentication, on the other hand, refers to the process whereby an 
organisation establishes its degree of confidence in an assertion that a party is a specific 
instance of the species homo sapiens.  The entification of a human entity depends on the 
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gathering of an entifier of the person, i.e. a biometric.  The authentication process 
involves a cross-check of the entifier against a reference measure.  Despite the confidence 
expressed by marketers of biometrics technology, a considerable degree of difficulty is 
involved in implementing effective schemes, and they are highly privacy-invasive (Clarke 
2002). 
The quality of (id)entification, and of the authentication of (id)entity, depends on many 
factors, and the challenges involved result in a substantial incidence of false inclusions 
and false exclusions.  Because of the inevitability of quality shortfalls, a system designer 
needs to carefully consider the following: 
• the repudiability of an assertion.  This includes such questions as how an 
(id)entity contests information stored on another (id)entity's records; 
• the onus of proof.  This involves establishing on which (id)entity the 
responsibility lies to establish that data is or is not of appropriate quality;  and 
• the allocation of costs.  This determines which party bears the cost and 
inconvenience that arise in the (id)entification and authentication processes, and 
where the quality of data is contested. 
 
This sub-section has demonstrated that the authentication of human identity and entity is 
far more complex and challenging than it is assumed to be by the purveyors of 
conventional PKI, and is in most circumstances probably a forlorn hope.  The following 
sub-sections consider the extent to which, even where human (id)entification and 
authentication are feasible, it is a sufficient, and an appropriate, means of enabling e-
business. 
2.2 Assertions about Organisational Entities and Identities 
A huge amount of e-business involves organisations, including business enterprises, 
government agencies and associations (also known as non-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations).  An assertion that a message has originated from, or been sent to, a 
particular organisation, would appear to be a very important category of assertion to 
authenticate. 
The concept of 'organisation' requires consideration.  In order to mobilise resources, the 
concept of 'incorporation' was created.  The original 'bodies corporate' took the form of 
'joint stock companies'.  The idea has been applied in many other circumstances as well, 
in order to create entities distinct from the people who make them up. 
Identifiers of corporations include their names, and the codes assigned to them by 
registration bodies and other organisations.  On the other hand, corporations evidence 
many identities, such as business units, business names and brands, which may not be 
distinguished for the relevant legal purposes, and which may or may not have reliable 
identifiers. 
Government agencies are even more problematical.  Many cannot be formally 
distinguished from the 'body politic' of which they are a part, and many that do have an 
independent legal existence have uncertain names, and no registration codes. 
Moreover, there has to be doubt that the concept of an entifier for an organisation has any 
meaning.  Organisations have no physical existence, and are merely legal fictions:  there 
can be no equivalent to a human biometric.  The authentication of an assertion of 
organisational entity is therefore seriously problematical, in both the worlds of 
conventional business and of e-business. 
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The authentication of an assertion of organisational identity is also difficult.  Commonly-
used authenticators include the affixing of a company seal, letterhead, and callback to a 
telephone-number acquired from another source.  These provide only a modest degree of 
assurance.  Equivalents in the electronic world are similarly difficult to contrive.  To 
seriously suggest that an entity that has no real-world existence can possess a private key, 
and can invoke it in order to sign messages, is to drift towards a dangerous fantasy-land. 
This and the previous sub-section have demonstrated that assertions that relate to humans 
and to organisations are very difficult to authenticate.  This suggests that it might be an 
appropriate time to examine other kinds of assertions and establishe whether they are 
more readily authenticated. 
2.3 Assertions about Artefact Entities and Identities 
The term artefact is used in this paper to refer to devices such as workstations, smart 
cards and robots, together with software agents.  These exhibit more or less intelligent 
behaviour, with more or less independence from individuals, and are perhaps gradually 
tending towards sentience (Clarke 1993-94).  Artefacts are substantially involved in e-
business, and there are many circumstances in which it is appropriate to check the 
likelihood that the artefact that originated  a message is as it appears to be, or is asserted 
to be. 
Entifiers for hardware artefacts include processor-ids, and network interface card (NIC) 
ids.  They are somewhat more challenging to define for software artefacts.   Artefact 
identities, on the other hand, can be signified using smartcard segment-IDs, process-ids 
such as sockets and web-server ids, and web-page URLs and email-addresses.  An IP(v4)-
address says nothing about which artefact was using it at the time, and is therefore at best 
a proxy for an artefact entifier. 
The authentication of assertions about artefacts is challenging, but less seriously difficult 
than the authentication of assertions about people and about organisations.  Moreover, 
confidence arising from authentication of artefacts can make valuable contributions to 
trust in e-business.  But before lowering our sights too far, we need to consider what other 
categories of assertion are relevant. 
2.4 Assertions about Attributes, Agency and Location 
(Id)entities have attributes.  Attributes of human entities relevant to e-business include 
age-range, association membership, and educational or other qualification.  Organisations 
have attributes such as registered health care provider, and pre-qualified tenderer.  
Artefacts may have a particular configuration, or a particular capability such as a being 
able to display or print data. 
Assertions of the possession of an attribute can be subjected to attribute authentication 
through the inspection of a credential that attests to that (id)entity possessing that 
attribute.  Many circumstances exist in which the credential identifies the person, but this 
is not actually necessary.  All that is needed is some means whereby the credential is 
reliably associated with the (id)entity presenting the credential.  For example, a series of 
challenges for information may be sufficient to establish that a person qualifies for entry 
to premises, without even knowing their (id)entity let alone authenticating it. 
Moreover, even where the process of attribute authentication involves the provision of an 
(id)entifier, there may be no need to record anything more than the fact that 
authentication was performed.  In this way, the transaction ceases to be identified.  An 
example of this is the inspection of so-called 'photo-id', without recording the (id)entifier 
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displayed on the card.  Smartcard-based schemes can be readily devised such that identity 
and even entity authentication can be performed, but without yielding up the (id)entifier 
for recording in an information system. 
In addition to the kinds of attributes discussed above, two particular sub-categories are of 
great significance in e-business.  One is the legal authority to act on behalf of another 
(id)entity, generally referred to as agency.  The representative is referred to as an agent, 
and the party being represented is called the principal. 
Humans appoint agents, with various terms being used in various contexts, such as 
authorised signatory and attorney (as in 'power of attorney', rather than 'district attorney').  
Organisations lack corporeal form, and therefore have no ability to act in either the 
physical or the electronic worlds.  In order to enter into contracts, place orders, receive 
deliveries, instigate payments, accept orders, and initiate the fulfilment of orders, they 
have no option but to delegate to agents.  In many cases, organisations delegate to other 
organisations, but, eventually, for any action to be taken, the last organisation in the chain 
has to depend on a human, or possibly an artefact that has the capacity to act in the real 
world. 
In this context, as in many other instances discussed so far, an assertion about agency 
may or may not include an assertion about (id)entity, either of the agent or the principal.  
For example, many auctions permit nymous offerors and/or nymous bidders.  Credentials 
and processes designed to assist in authentication need to support identity-less agency 
relationships. 
When conducting agency authentication, care is needed to ensure that the relationship 
between principal and agent exists at the relevant time, that it encompasses the kind of 
transaction being conducted, and that the transaction does not exceed any limitations on 
the agent's power to act on behalf of the principal, and to bind the principal in contract.  A 
further complication is that an agent may act for multiple principals, and a principal may 
be represented by multiple agents.  This results in multiple credentials, and scope for 
conflicts of interest to arise that need to be managed. 
Analogous arrangements have been envisaged for the electronic context, applying 
cryptographic techniques.  One approach that might be used is to authenticate the 
(id)entity of the individual and/or body corporate (as discussed in the preceding sub-
sections), and then check some kind of register of (id)entities authorised to act on behalf 
of the relevant body.  The register might even be implemented in distributed fashion, by 
setting an indicator within the person's own digital signature chip-card. 
Another approach is direct authentication of an authorisation.  For example, a body 
corporate's private key could be used to digitally sign a particular kind of instrument, 
which a recipient could confirm (using the body corporate's widely available public key).  
This would be a more direct mechanism, and would avoid unnecessary declaration and 
authentication of the (id)entity of the agent.  It would, on the other hand, involve risk of 
appropriation or theft of what amounts to a bearer instrument. 
Another important kind of attribute is location.  An assertion might be of the form 'the 
(id)entity that originated this message did so from, or in respect of, a particular location, 
within some tolerance range'.  Location authentication might involve location and 
tracking technologies such as the triangulation of cell-phone signals or the use of global 
positioning systems (GPS). 
Location authentication has potential applicability to a variety of contexts, such as 
distributed order fulfilment, mobile commerce (e.g. fleet management, motor vehicle hire, 
driver assistance, road-tolling, breakdown services, and insurance), and legal constraints 
(e.g. censorship and on-line gambling).  The justification advanced for imposing tracking 
capabilities on cellular phones has been search-and-rescue.  As is the case with all other 
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kinds of attributes, mechanisms are needed that support location authentication with and 
without (id)entity. 
2.5 Assertions About Value 
Every instance of authentication considered above as a basis for trust in e-business is 
challenging, some of them extremely so.  This makes it especially important that a further 
relevant form not be overlooked:  value authentication. 
A party commonly seeks assurance that the consideration offered by another party 
delivers the value it purports to.  In most cases, 'value' is best understood in terms of 
fungibility (or convertibility to cash);  but value may also be represented by vouchers 
such as certificates and tickets;  and value can be imputed by the recipient of goods, 
services or information. 
Examples of value authentication include the checking of a banknote for forgery-
resistant features like metal wires or holograms.  In the electronic context, they include 
the seeking of pre-authorisation of credit-card payments;  messages stating that funds 
have been transferred from the sender's account to an account nominated by the receiver;  
and messages that contain the electronic equivalent of a coin of a particular value in a 
particular currency. 
A further important mechanism is value escrow.  This involves a third party receiving 
value from both parties to a transaction, authenticating it, holding it temporarily in trust, 
and releasing it to the respective parties only after it has evidence that both have fulfilled 
their obligations.  The interpolation of such an intermediary brings advantages;  but it also 
incurs additional costs, and creates additional risks, such as malperformance, fraud and 
insolvency of the escrow agent. 
In a great deal of conventional commerce, value authentication without identity is a 
primary means whereby trust is achieved.  In e-commerce, however, an aberration has 
arisen:  in its few short years to date, the sole practical payment mechanism has been 
through the transmission of credit card details, which carry an identifier of the cardholder.  
Payment mechanisms that do not have an identifier associated with them have been 
conceived, designed, prototyped, implemented, and trialled, but have not yet been widely 
adopted.  The deployment of value authentication without disclosure of identity 
represents a real opportunity to unlock the potential of e-commerce. 
The model presented in this section has identified 15 kinds of assertions whose 
authentication is relevant to e-business.  They are summarised in Appendix 1.  The 
following section considers public key technology, as a prelude to evaluating 
conventional and alternative approaches to applying it to support authentication of the 
various assertion-types. 
3. Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key technologies assure a message-recipient that the artefact that originated the 
message had access to a particular private key.  Making the assumption that the sender 
was therefore one particular arefact is inadvisable, however, unless a range of risks is 
satisfactorily addressed.  These include the possibilities that the private key might be 
available to other artefacts as well, that the signature-generation process might be able to 
be invoked by other artefacts as well, and that the public key used to check the signature 
might have been provided by an imposter. 
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Managing those risks requires infrastructure to support the bare technology.  In particular, 
the key-pair needs to be associated with something in the real world.  (The term 
commonly used in the computer security literature is the 'binding' of the key to something 
in the real world – and the something is almost always presumed to be an (id)entity, and 
almost always the (id)entity of a human being.  But the term 'binding' implies a much 
tighter form of association than is actually feasible, and is therefore avoided in this 
paper). 
Various infrastructure designs and processes have been proposed, mostly based on 
directory entries and/or signed copies of directory entries conventionally referred to as 
'digital certificates'.  Depending on the degree of control exercised over artefact 
manufacture, the network, and connections to it, moderate degrees of confidence can be 
established in relation to 2 of the 15 categories of assertion:  those relating to artefact 
(id)entity. 
Authentication of the other 13 categories of assertion cannot be satisfied by public key 
technology alone, because they involve entities that are outside the networked world.  The 
association of the key-pair with something in the real world needs to be pre-authenticated. 
The term 'public key infrastructure' (PKI) is subject to a variety of interpretations, and 
all too commonly its meaning is left defined.  (See, for example, Webopedia and 
FOLDOC).  It is used in this paper to refer to the comprehensive set of measures needed 
to enable public key technologies to support the authentication of assertions.  Appendix 2 
summarises the elements that make up such a PKI.  Business and public policy 
requirements are examined in greater detail in Clarke (2001c). 
Fundamental requirements are that the PKI must: 
• encompass the authentication of all of the 15 forms of assertion that are relevant 
to e-business, and not just a sub-set of them; 
• provide comprehensive protections against the risks involved, rather than 
addressing only some arbitrarily-selected sub-set of them; 
• support varying strengths of authentication, from unauthenticated, via weakly 
authenticated and moderately authenticated, to strongly authenticated; 
• be practicable; 
• be economic;  and 
• reflect the interests of all stakeholders, rather than just those of the sponsors.  
Public policy requirements have to date generally been overlooked. 
4. Is There a Role for Conventional, X.509-Based PKI? 
The vast majority of designs that have been proposed to date, and that have been 
implemented to date, depend upon digital certificates of a particular format, specified in 
the CCITT X.509 standard.  This was designed in a very different context from the open 
public Internet that has emerged since the mid-1990s;  but X.509 was the hammer that 
came to hand when the nail was discovered.  X.509 primarily defines a certificate-format, 
but implies some requirements of the infrastructure to support their use. 
As a product of a lengthy consultative process, the X.509 standard embodies very 
substantial flexibility and even looseness.  See Gutmann (2000).  Reflecting its origins as 
an element of the X.500 family of directory standards, it is heavily oriented towards 
identity, to the extent that attribute certificates are tied to an identity (as 'children' of a 
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'parent' certificate).  Fixities of definition present serious challenges to the design of 
anonymity and pseudonymity, and even to the availability of multiple keys and 
certificates for members of the public. 
Conventional infrastructure built to apply the X.509 standard depends on organisations 
called Certification Authorities (CAs) that provide cryptographically secure 'certification' 
that purports to offer some kind of assurance about the association between the public key 
and something in the real world.  CAs in turn depend on so-called Registration 
Authorities (RAs) to perform pre-authentication of that association, by means of 
procedures conducted in the real world, such as comparison of a person's appearance 
against 'photo-id' that they present, inspection of documents, and perhaps checking of the 
possession of the private key.  For a comprehensive treatment of the inadequacies of 
conventional PKI, see Clarke (2001a), and several other references provided in that paper. 
In an attempt to stimulate uptake of conventional PKI, information technology providers 
have productised CA and RA services.  This has had the effect of imposing a fixed form 
of the providers' limited vision on all potential users:  instead of application-specific 
choices in relation to the type of assertion to be authenticated, the processes to be used, 
and the strength of authentication to be achieved, CAs have offered a take-it-or-leave-it 
approach.  It has achieved very slow take-up. 
In closed networks, tight control may be able to be exercised over artefacts, and 
conventional PKI may be effective for authenticating artefact (id)entity and perhaps also 
artefact attributes.  It may be feasible to apply such techniques to artefacts in open 
networks.  It is not clear, however, that certificates and CAs offer a great deal more than a 
simpler scheme based on private keys embedded within devices at the time of 
manufacture, and relying on directory-entries rather than meaningless certificates. 
In summary, it appears that the X.509v3 standard supports authentication of artefact 
(id)entities, yet is marketed primarily as a means of authentication of human identities.  
X.509 certificates essentially preclude anonymity.  They might conceivably be used to 
support pseudonymity, but only if the policies, procedures and practices within RAs and 
CAs are designed to do so, and if technical, organisational and legal protections exist for 
the records that relate the name in the certificate to the (id)entity of the 'subject'. 
Hence conventional X.509-based PKI offer inferior solutions, and for only perhaps 4 or 5 
of the 15 needs identified earlier in this paper, namely: 
• identity authentication for humans, provided that highly privacy-intrusive 
processes are successfully imposed; 
• (id)entity authentication for artefacts;  and 
• attribute authentication, for humans and for artefacts, but only with identity. 
 
Their very substantial bias towards identification, and away from anonymity and 
pseudonymity, work in favour of surveillance and privacy-invasiveness, and against 
public acceptability.  Applications of PKI that inherit these inadequacies include 
SSL/TLS, PKIX, S/MIME and W3C XML-Signature (aka XMLDSig).  A recent 
application, so-called 'Qualified Certificates' (RFC3039, 2001) specifies the kind of 
electronic national ID mechanism of which totalitarian dreams and nightmares are made. 
The deficiencies in X.509 are intrinsic to the standard.  X.509 derived from the simplistic 
and threatening X.500 notion of a centralised world directory.   It was an inappropriate 
foundation for PKI to support e-business across the open public Internet.  The prospect of 
further revisions to X.509 overcoming its deficiencies seems unlikely.  If progress is to be 
made in PKI, consideration needs to be given to other approaches. 
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5. Alternative Public Key Technologies 
This section considers alternative approaches to the use of public key technologies for 
authentication in the e-business context.  For example, certificate formats other than 
X.509 can be used as a basis for a PKI.  Several exist that, unlike X.509, were designed 
for the specific purpose.  See Gerck (1997-2000) and  Ellison (2000).  These include: 
• PKCS#6 (which is a specification for a super-set of X.509) (RSA 1993); 
• Pretty Good Privacy (PGP – Zimmerman 1995); 
• SPKI/SDSI (Wang 1998, Ellison et al. 1999, Rivest & Lampson 1996);  and 
• Brandsian Private Credentials (Brands 2000). 
 
Another approach is to move the focus away from certificates, and avoid unjustified 
assumptions that are inherent in conventional PKI.  PGP, SPKI/SDSI and Brandsian 
technologies each move in that direction.  Additional technologies that avoid certificates 
include: 
• Blazian Trust Management Systems (Blaze 1999);  and 
• Account Authority Digital Signature Model (AADS – Wheeler 1998, Wheeler & 
Wheeler 1998). 
 
AADS is an example of a scheme that depends on independent or 'out of band' pre-
authentication of the association between a key-pair and an (id)entity.  This may be 
achieved through the existence of a prior relationship between the parties (or an 'account' 
held by one with the other), or, more generally, by leveraging off an existing community 
of interest.  It is, however, primarily targetted at the authentication of the identity of 
humans and organisations, and attributes with identity, and possibly agency with identity, 
for a total of perhaps 4 of the 15 categories that this paper concluded were relevant to e-
business. 
PGP uses certificates, but enables anyone to issue a certificate.  It thereby places the onus 
on the relying party to make its own decisions as to the level of confidence it places in the 
key-pair actually being associated with whatever real-world thing it purports to.  (This 
'web of trust' notion has drifted back into fashion in the X.509 world under the alternative 
rubric of 'mesh architecture').  PGP is capable of being applied so as to support perhaps 7 
of the 15 categories of authentication, including identity, attribute and agency. 
The SPKI/SDSI and Blazian approaches regard the association between key-pair and 
identity as a separate matter unaddressed by public key technology.  Blazian trust 
management, in common with all authorisation technologies, focusses primarily on 
privileges and restrictions.  Attributes are associated with public keys, not with 
(id)entities.  It would appear capable of being applied to perhaps as many as 10 of the 15 
categories. 
SPKI/SDSI uses local rather than global names, and hence supports both pseudonyms and 
multiple identities per entity.  It appears to be applicable to about 10 of the categories of 
assertion that require authentication, with the major exceptions of value authentication 
and probably entity authentication. 
The most revolutionary and complete alternative appears to be Brandsian Private 
Credentials.  These use a refined form of cryptography and certificate, such that privacy 
is protected without sacrificing security.  The validity of such certificates and their 
contents can be checked, but the identity of the certificate-holder cannot be extracted, and 
different actions by the same person cannot be linked.  Certificate holders have control 
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over what information is disclosed, and to whom.  Brandsian private credentials are 
fundamentally anonymous, but implementations can be devised to achieve pseudonymity 
or identification.  They are claimed by their originator to encompass conventional 
X.509v3 digital certificates as a special case.  This approach appears capable of being 
applied to virtually all of the 15 categories, including value authentication, although (in 
common with every approach except RFC3039 'Qualified Certificates') it is not targetted 
at entity authentication. 
6. Conclusions 
Public key technology has some inherent problems in relation to: 
• the insecurity of key-pair generation; 
• the insecurity of private-key storage;  and 
• insecurity arising from timing difficulties, especially key-pair revocation. 
 
Irrespective of the design of the PKI and of applications that use it, a certificate provides 
no assurance about whether: 
• the private key was originally available to other (id)entities as well as the 
(id)entity with which it purports to be associated; 
• the private key is now available to other (id)entities as well as the (id)entity with 
which it purports to be associated; 
• the private key invocation that gave rise to a particular message was performed 
by the (id)entity;  and 
• the private key invocation that gave rise to a particular message was performed 
with the (id)entity's free and informed consent. 
 
The challenge is to deliver PKI that provides sufficiently convincing evidence to increase 
confidence in the categories of assertion identified earlier, enables a risk-managed 
approach to the inherent weaknesses of public key technology, and avoids creating any 
additional weaknesses. 
Conventional X.509-based PKI embodies a large number of additional problems, and in 
any case addresses only 4 or 5 of the 15 categories of authentication actually needed to 
support e-business. 
Alternative approaches exist, and have already been deployed in the field, which offer 
more effective authentication than does conventional PKI based on X.509 certificates.  Of 
these, SPKI/SDSI and Brandsian Private Credentials offer particular promise as a basis 
for PKI that will satisfy the many conflicting interests of the many stakeholders in e-
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Appendix 1: 15 Kinds of Assertions Relevant to e-Business 
The model of authentication for e-business presented in this paper distinguishes 15 kinds 
of assertions: 
• Entity Authentication: 
o for humans, of the form 'the person who originated this message is the 
person who uses a particular entifier'; 
o for organisations, of the form 'the organisation on whose behalf this 
message was originated is the organisation that uses a particular entifier'; 
o for artefacts, of the form 'the artefact that originated this message is the 
artefact that uses a particular entifier'. 
• Identity Authentication: 
o for humans, of the form 'the identity or role that originated this message 
is the one that uses a particular identifier'; 
o for organisations, of the form 'the organisational role on whose behalf 
this message was originated is the organisational role that uses a 
particular identifier'; 
o for artefacts, of the form 'the role within an artefact that originated this 
message is the role that uses a particular identifier'. 
• Attribute Authentication: 
o with (id)entity., of the form 'the (id)entity that originated this message 
has both a particular (id)entifier, and a particular attribute'; 
o without (id)entity, of the form 'the (id)entity that originated this message 
has a particular attribute', but no assurance exists as to who the (id)entity 
is that has that attribute. 
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• Agency Authentication: 
o with the (id)entity of both the principal and the agent, of the form 'the 
(id)entity that originated this message has a particular (id)entifier, and is 
the appointed agent for another specified (id)entity'; 
o without the (id)entity of the principal, of the form 'the (id)entity that 
originated this message is the appointed agent for another unspecified 
(id)entity'; 
o without the (id)entity of the agent, of the form 'the (id)entity that 
originated this message is the appointed agent for another specified 
(id)entity'. 
• Location Authentication: 
o with (id)entity, of the form 'a specified (id)entity originated this message, 
and did so from, or in respect of, a particular location, within some 
tolerance range'; 
o without (id)entity, of the form 'an (id)entity whose (id)entifier is not 
known originated this message from, or in respect of, a particular 
location, within some tolerance range'. 
• Value Authentication: 
o with (id)entity, of the form 'this message was originated by a particular 
(id)entity, and its contents have a particular value to the recipient'; 
o without (id)entity, of the form 'the contents of this message have a 
particular value to the recipient'. 
Appendix 2:    Elements of a PKI to Support Authentication 
• Standards and Protocols: 
o standards for encryption algorithms and hashing algorithms; 
o protocols for agreeing parameters associated with encryption algorithms 
and hashing algorithms; 
o protocols for making public keys available to message-recipients; 
o protocols for making revocation notices available to message-recipients; 
o standards for the secure generation of secure key-pairs; 
o standards and protocols to support device-synchronisation and date-time-
stamps with evidentiary value; 
o possibly, standards and protocols for notarisation services, to enhance the 
evidentiary value of transaction records. 
• Software: 
o to generate key-pairs; 
o to store private keys; 
o to store public keys; 
o to make public keys available to message-recipients; 
o to generate MACs or message digests from messages; 
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o to apply private keys to encrypt MACs or message digests; 
o to compose messages; 
o to acquire public keys; 
o to check public keys: 
 as to their validity; 
 as to their currency; 
 as to whether they have been revoked; 
o to apply senders' public keys to decrypt messages; 
o to apply senders' public keys to decrypt MACs or message digests; 
o to compare MACs or message digests in order to check digital signatures; 
o to acquire time-signals; 
o possibly to invoke, and to perform, notarisation services. 
• Protections for Private Keys: 
o against unauthorised access while in storage; 
o against unauthorised access while in main memory; 
o against unauthorised invocation. 
• If a directory is used as a repository for public keys: 
o protocols for inserting data into and maintaining data in the repository; 
o protocols for access to data in the repository. 
• If certificates are used to communicate public keys and/or for communicating 
some kind of assurance about the entity that uses the corresponding private keys: 
o standards for certificate-formats; 
o profiles for application of the standards in particular contexts; 
o protocols for the communication of certificates to parties that need them; 
o means whereby recipients of messages can judge whether to check the 
digital signatures on certificates; 
o means whereby recipients of messages can check the digital signatures 
on the certificates; 
o means whereby recipients of messages can judge the extent to which 
various forms of assertion to have been authenticated;  
o if certificates are signed by 'certificate authorities' (CAs): 
o standards for CAs; 
o standards and procedures for registration and audit of CAs; 
o procedures for recourse by parties against CAs; 
o insurance arrangements for CAs. 
• A Legal Framework to: 
o establish the responsibilities of the various parties; 
o establish the warranties provided by the various parties; 
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o assign residual risks; 
o enable recourse by an injured party. 
• If pre-authentication of the association between the key-pair and something 
in the real world is defined to be part of the PKI rather than an application-
level issue, then the PKI must include means to establish the association of the 
key-pair with a device, person, legal entity, attribute, agency relationship and/or 
location.  The elements involved are likely to comprise: 
o standards for authenticating the relationship claimed; 
o procedures for authenticating the relationship claimed; 
o means of communicating the relationship claimed and authenticated; 
o a sufficient set of operational registration authorities (RAs) providing 
pre-authentication services; 
o a statement as to the warranties provided by the RA and CA; 
o means of communicating the warranties provided. 
• Services: 
o application design services; 
o software libraries; 
o security audit services; 
o possibly directory services for public keys, digital certificates and/or 
revocations; 
o possibly backup services for private keys;  
o if certificates are signed by CAs, then a sufficient set of operational CAs; 
o insurance services, especially for CAs and RAs; 
o time-services; 
o possibly notarisation services. 
 
